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Empirical work suggests that while government spending induces an increase in output, it
does not significantly decrease private consumption. Contrary to these findings, most repre-
sentative-household models in macroeconomics predict a crowding-out of private consumption
by government spending. To address this issue, we develop a model with heterogeneous house-
holds and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk as in Aiyagari (1994). In a model with heterogeneous
households, progressivity of taxes is a key determinant of the effects of government spending. A
rise in government spending can be expansionary, both for output and consumption, if financed
with more progressive labor taxes. However, it is contractionary if financed with less progres-
sive taxes. With a narrative approach, we use large changes in military spending to provide
evidence that government spending in the United States has been expansionary only in periods
of increasing progressivity.
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I Introduction
What are the effects of a temporary increase in government spending on private consumption and output?
Although a recurrent question in policy debates, there exists a wide range of empirical and theoretical findings
in the literature.1 While some empirical work finds that an increase in government spending induces an
expansion on private consumption, others argue that consumption only reacts mildly. At odds with these
results, most commonly used models in macroeconomics predict a decrease in private consumption after
an increase in government spending. In this paper, we aim to reconcile these findings by emphasizing the
importance of taxes. We develop a model with heterogeneous households and idiosyncratic risk (Aiyagari,
1994) to assess the effects of government spending. As compared to models with a representative household,
the new component in our paper is the existence of a distribution of taxes across households. We find that the
progressivity of taxes is a key determinant of the effects of government spending. A rise in public consumption
can be expansionary, both for output and private consumption, if financed with more progressive labor taxes.
However, it is contractionary if financed with less progressive taxes. Finally, following a narrative approach
as in Ramey and Shapiro (1998), we use events of large changes in military spending to provide evidence
that, as suggested by our model, government spending in the US has been expansionary only in periods of
increasing progressivity.
Typically, empirical work measures the effects of government spending by means of a multiplier: the
amount of dollars that consumption or output increase by after a $1 increase in government spending. Table
1 briefly summarizes multipliers found in previous work. Output multipliers range from 0.3 to unity, while
consumption multipliers are closer to zero - typically not larger than 0.1.2 These inconclusive findings are
already puzzling: as we argue in Section I.A, ‘standard’ models in macroeconomics predict a crowding-out
of private consumption after an increase in public consumption.3 By analyzing the role of taxes across
heterogeneous households, our paper provides new insights on how model predictions can be brought in line
with empirical findings.
Our main result is that government spending multipliers depend on tax progressivity. The mechanism
is simple. There is large heterogeneity in household responses after a government spending shock, and the
key driver of these responses is the change in taxes associated with the shock. For instance, assume a rise
1Recently, the effects of government spending has been at the center of the debates on the implementation of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), one of the largest fiscal stimuli in US history. See Cogan
and Taylor (2012) for a recent discussion on the ARRA program and its implementation. See Alesina (2012) for a
discussion of the effects of fiscal policy beyond government spending.
2The main exception being Blanchard and Perotti (2002) who find large positive multipliers for consumption.
3By ‘standard’ we have in mind the two workhorse models in macroeconomics: the neoclassical growth model and
the benchmark New Keynesian model.
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Multipliers (on impact) Output Consumption
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 0.90 0.5
(0.30) (0.21)
Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) 0.41 0.1
(0.16) (0.10)
Barro and Redlick (2011) 0.45 0.005
(0.07) (0.09)
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) 0.65 0.001
(0.39) (0.0003)
Ramey (2011) 0.30 0.02
(0.10) (0.001)
Table 1: Output and Consumption Multipliers: Summary of the Empirical Literature
in public consumption that is financed through a temporary increase in tax progressivity. In this case,
low-income households may actually experience a decrease in taxes. In turn, they have incentives to work
and consume more during the periods of lower taxes. On the other hand, wealthy households face larger
taxes, but is easier for them to smooth out the shock with their savings. Overall, the economy experiences
an expansion. The same logic implies that a rise in public consumption financed with less progressive taxes
results in a contraction of the economy; different revenue-neutral tax systems have different implications on
aggregate quantities. The key mechanism this paper analyzes is how the burden of taxes is distributed across
households.4 To the best of our knowledge, this intuitive finding is new in the literature.
Our finding that tax progressivity shapes government spending multipliers is of particular importance
for empirical work if, as is the case for the United State, progressivity of taxes has significantly changed
over time. Figure 1 plots our measure of US federal tax progressivity for the years 1960-2006: progressivity
increased over the sixties and the seventies, then sharply decreased over the eighties and stabilized after
that.5 In line with our model predictions, in Section VI we find positive (negative) multipliers on output
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Figure 1: Federal taxes progressivity. US 1960-2006.
and consumption only when progressivity increased (decreased) with government spending.
I.A Breaking the Crowding-Out of Public on Private Consumption
Why can’t a ‘standard’ model deliver a positive multiplier on consumption? Consider a real business cycle
model with a representative household, competitive labor markets, and preferences over consumption c and
hours worked h given by:
U(c, h) =
c1−σ
1− σ −
h1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
As described in Hall (2009), the key equation for understanding the impact of government spending on
private consumption is the intra-temporal Euler equation. If lump-sum taxes are used by the government,
this equation reads as follows
↓ logmpht =↓ σ log ct+ ↑ ϕ log ht, (1)
4See Uhlig (2010) for a recent analysis on the effects of distributing the tax burden over time in a representative
household model.
5As a measure of progressivity, we computed the elasticity of after-tax income with respect to pre-tax income:
γ(y) = − ∂1−τ(y)
∂y
y
1−τ(y) , where τ(y) is the tax rate for an income level y. A higher value of γ(y) implies a tax rate
that increase faster with income, and thus a more progressive tax schedule. We use this definition of progressivity
because it coincides with the measure of progressivity in our model, where we assume a tax function τ(y) = 1−λy−γ ,
borrowed from Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014). We describe this function in detail in Section V.A and
explained the estimation of γ(y) in Appendix E.
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where mph is the marginal product of labor. This equation defines a very tight link between hours worked
and consumption: if, as typically found in the data, households work more after an increase in government
spending, the marginal product of labor falls and private consumption has to drop for equation (1) to hold.
In addition, if government expenditures are financed with labor income taxes τ , these taxes must increase
to finance the increase in public consumption.6 Thus, as shown in equation (2), consumption drops even
further, as initially remarked by Baxter and King (1993):
↓ log(1− τt)+ ↓ logmpht =↓↓ σ log ct+ ↑ ϕ log ht, (2)
This crowding-out effect of government spending on private consumption is typically seen as puzzling since,
as argued above, it is not in line with many empirical findings.
We break equation (2) in two dimensions. First, we assume an indivisible labor supply, as in Hansen
(1985) or Chang and Kim (2007). Then, equation (2) holds with inequality at the individual level, breaking
the tight link between government spending, consumption and labor. As pointed out by Chang and Kim
(2007), the indivisibility of labor choice generates a countercyclical labor wedge in equation (2) that can help
us solve this puzzle. This is due to the endogenous wealth distribution: when labor increases, less productive
households start working more; on average, these less productive households are less wealthy and exhibit a
larger propensity to consume out of a discrete increase in labor income. As shown in Section IV, this effect will
help us deliver larger output multipliers, but will not be enough to obtain positive consumption multipliers.
The second, and more important, way in which we break equation (2) is by assuming labor income taxes
that depend on households’ heterogeneous characteristics. As a consequence, at the moment of an increase
in government spending, some households may face larger taxes while others may see a reduction in their
taxes. The distribution of the tax burden towards wealthier households generates a positive consumption
multiplier. This is the key new force that we analyze in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we discuss previous work and how it is
related to our paper. Section III outlines the benchmark model in steady state with constant government
spending and taxes. Section IV analyzes the effects of government spending when only lump-sum taxes are
used. First, we find that households with different wealth levels respond very differently. Second, indivisible
labor induces larger output multipliers, but does not deliver positive consumption multipliers. In Section V,
we analyze progressive labor taxes. We show that output and consumption multipliers depend crucially on
the tax scheme: the size and sign of multipliers depend on the changes in progressivity. Section VI uses a
6We are implicitly assuming a balanced budget.
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narrative approach to estimate the effects of military spending during periods of different tax progressivity.
In line with the model, we find that US government spending has been expansionary only in periods of
increasing progressivity. In Section VII we shutdown government spending shocks and focuses on the effects
of changes in progressivity and transfers across households.7 We find that changes in progressivity, as well
as transfers across households, are a powerful tool for inducing output and consumption expansion. Section
VIII concludes.
II Literature Review
Our paper is related to three lines of research: (i) the empirical literature on the effects of government
spending, (ii) models with government spending, and (iii) models with heterogeneous households. We discuss
the connections of our paper to each topic.
There is a large body of empirical work that attempts to estimate the effects of government spending
on aggregate output and consumption.8 This literature can roughly be divided into two approaches: one
that identifies government spending shocks using a structural VAR approach; another one using a narrative
approach that focuses on periods of large changes in government spending.9,10 Typically, papers using a
structural VAR approach (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles, 2007; and Mountford
and Uhlig, 2009, among others) find large output multipliers (close to unity) and significantly positive
consumption multipliers. With varied methodological refinements, Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) and
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) also find large output and consumption multipliers. Also in a structural
VAR set-up, Ramey (2011) uses a “news” variable on military spending and finds significantly smaller
multipliers for output and consumption. Similar results are found in Barro and Redlick (2011) when using
Ramey’s “news” variable. On the other hand, Ramey and Shapiro (1998), implement a narrative approach by
using dummy variables on dates of military spending.11 They find smaller output multipliers and negative or
zero consumption multipliers. We contribute to this debate in Section VI by taking into account a measures
of tax progressivity. Using a narrative approach, we argue that government spending multipliers in the US
has been expansionary only in periods of increasing progressivity.
7Oh and Reis (2012) have recently argued that transfers across households represents a significant part of govern-
ment spending.
8See Hall (2009) for a recent comprehensive review of the literature.
9See Perotti (2007) for an comprehensive comparison of both methodologies.
10The narrative approach literature generally uses government spending in periods of wars or military buildups,
which dates are believed to be independent of the state of the economy and thus exogenous.
11See Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) and Perotti (2007) for variations on Ramey and Shapiro (1998).
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In addition, two recent empirical papers (Giavazzi and McMahon, 2012; and De Giorgi and Gambetti,
2012) have also focused on the effects of government spending on heterogeneous households. Their conclusions
strongly diverge. Using PSID and CEX household-level data from the period 1996-2006, together with
US military spending at the state level, Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) find that a temporary increase
in government spending tends to slightly increase consumption inequality: low-income households decrease
their consumption, while higher-income households do not. However, as they acknowledge, their identification
strategy partly prevents them from estimating the negative wealth effects associated with increases in taxes.12
On the contrary, De Giorgi and Gambetti (2012) argue that an increase in government spending induces a
decrease in consumption inequality. They use CEX data from 1984-2008 to build average consumption per
deciles, and then use a structural VAR to estimate the effect of government spending on each consumption
decile. We contribute to this debate as well. We show that the findings of Giavazzi and McMahon (2012)
are consistent with the effects of government spending on a subset of households that would not face any
change in taxes. Typically, after an increase in government spending, wages decrease and interest rates
increase. This leads to a decrease in consumption for indebted working households, but an increase in
consumption for wealthy households. However, we argue that when we account for the effect of taxes, the
findings of De Giorgi and Gambetti (2012) are more likely to be observed, especially in periods of increasing
tax progressivity. Finally, we find that the effect of changes in taxes strongly dominates the price effect
of government purchases in our model: the “general equilibrium” effects of government spending are small
when compared to the changes in taxes (wealth effect).13
The theoretical literature on the government spending effects on private consumption is large and still
growing. Since the seminal paper of Baxter and King (1993), which describes how public consumption crowds-
out private consumption in a standard real business cycle model, theoretical research has been conducted
in several directions in order to mitigate this crowding-out effect. For instance, Gali, Lopez-Salido, and
Valles (2007) use sticky wages together with rule-of-thumb households in order to generate a joint increase
in public and private consumption. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) also uses a model with
nominal rigidities to argue that, as in a zero lower bound scenario, if the monetary policy is not very
responsive, government spending can have large expansionary effects. Similar logic is analyzed by Nakamura
and Steinsson (2013). Both of these papers argue that non-separable preferences are necessary to obtain
large multipliers, which is also stressed by Bilbiie (2009). In a paper more closely related to ours, Bilbiie,
Monacelli, and Perotti (2012) study the effect of government spending in a New-Keynesian economy with two
12See page 3 of their paper.
13Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) also argue that their estimates are rather small.
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type of agents: a saver and a borrower. With this exogenous distribution of wealth, and the use of nominal
rigidities, they can also deliver positive multipliers on aggregate consumption. Lastly, Uhlig (2010) uses a
real business cycle model with a representative household to point out that the distribution of distortionary
taxes over time is key to analyze government spending shocks. Our contribution to this literature is to show
that the distribution of taxes across households is crucial; small changes in the progressivity of taxes across
households have first-order effects on aggregate output and consumption in a very standard macroeconomic
model with a reasonable distribution of wealth.
There is a large literature regarding fiscal policy in models with heterogeneous households. Heathcote
(2005) uses a similar economy to ours to analyze private consumption responses to a temporary decrease
in lump-sum taxes. Similarly, Kaplan and Violante (2013) analyze the effects of tax rebates in an economy
with heterogeneous households that hold liquid and illiquid assets. Oh and Reis (2012) and McKay and
Reis (2013) analyze the effects of tax-and-transfers programs across households, which is the object of our
study in Section VII. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) use a non-linear tax function to study
the optimal tax progressivity level in a model with heterogeneous agents. To the best of our knowledge, our
paper is the first to study public consumption in an Aiyagari (1994) economy. It is also the first to emphasize
the importance of the progressivity of the taxation scheme to understand government multipliers on private
consumption.
III Model
In this section, we describe the steady state of the economy when government spending and taxes are
constant. We end this section by discussing our calibration strategy. In the following sections, we investigate
the effects of government spending shocks in this economy.
III.A Environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The economy is populated by a continuum of households, a
representative firm, and a government. The firm has access to a constant return to scale technology in labor
and capital given by
Y = K1−αLα
where K and L stand for capital and labor, respectively, and Y denotes total output. Both factor inputs are
supplied by households. We assume constant total productivity.
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Households: Households have preferences over sequences of consumption and hours worked given as
follows:
Eo
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log ct −B h
1+1/ϕ
t
1 + 1/ϕ
]
where ct and ht stand for consumption and hours worked in period t. Households have access to a one period
risk-free bond, subject to a borrowing limit a. They make an indivisible labor supply decision: during any
given period, they can either work h¯ hours or zero.14 Their idiosyncratic labor productivity x follows a
Markov process with transition probabilities pix(x
′, x).
Let V (a, x) be the value function of a worker with level of assets a and idiosyncratic productivity x.
Then,
V (a, x) = max{V N (a, x), V E(a, x)} (3)
where V E(a, x) and V N (a, x) stand for the value of being employed and non-employed, respectively. The
value of being employed is given by
V E(a, x) = max
c,a′
{
log(c)−B h¯
1+1/ϕ
1 + 1/ϕ
+ βEx′ [V (a′, x′)|x]
}
(4)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ wxh¯+ (1 + r)a− T − τ(wxh¯, ra)
a′ ≥ a
where w stands for wages, r for the interest rate and a is an exogenous borrowing limit. Note that households
face two type of taxes: a lump-sum tax T and a distortionary tax τ(wxh, ra). The latter tax depends on
labor income wxh and capital earnings ra. The function τ(·) could accommodate different tax specifications,
including affine taxes.
Analogously, the value for a non-employed household is given by
V N (a, x) = max
c,a′
{log(c) + βEx′ [V (a′, x′)|x]} (5)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r)a− T − τ(0, ra)
a′ ≥ a
14With indivisible labor, it is redundant to have two parameters B and ϕ. We keep this structure to ease the
comparison with an environment with divisible labor in a later section.
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If the household decides not to work, he does not obtain any labor earnings, but does not experience disutility
of working. Every period, each household compares value functions (4) and (5) and makes labor, consumption
and savings decisions accordingly. Let h(a, x), c(a, x) and a′(a, x) denote his optimal policies.
Firms: Every period, the firm chooses labor and capital demand in order to maximize current profits,
Π = max
K,L
{
K1−αLα − wL− (r + δ)K} (6)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Optimality conditions for the firm are standard: marginal
productivities are equalized to the cost of each factor.
w = αK1−αLα−1 (7)
r + δ = (1− α)K−αLα (8)
Government: The government’s budget constraint is given by:
G = T +
∫
τ(wxh, ra)dµ(a, x) (9)
where µ(a, x) is the measure of households with state (a, x) in the economy. Notice that in steady state,
government spending G as well as the tax policies τ(·) and T are kept constant. In the next section, we will
change this budget constraint in different ways and analyze its consequences.
Equilibrium: Let A be the space for assets and X the space for productivities. Define the state space
S = A×X and B the Borel σ−algebra induced by S. A formal definition of the competitive equilibrium for
this economy is provided below.
Definition 1 A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is given by: value functions{
V E(a, x), V N (a, x), V (a, x)
}
and polices {h(a, x), c(a, x), a′(a, x)} for the household; policies for the firm
{L,K}; government decisions {G,T, τ}; a measure µ over B; and prices {r, w} such that, given prices and
government decisions: (i) Household’s policies solve his problem and achieve value V (a, x), (ii) Firm’s poli-
cies solve his static problem, (iii) Government’s budget constraint is satisfied, (iv) Capital market clears:
K =
∫
B a
′(a, x)dµ(a, x), (v) Labor market clears: L =
∫
B xh(a, x)dµ(a, x), (vi) Goods market clears:
Y =
∫
B c(a, x)dµ(a, x) + δK + G, (vii) The measure µ is consistent with household’s policies: µ(B) =
10
∫
BQ((a, x),B)dµ(a, x) where Q is a transition function between any two periods defined by:
Q((a, x),B) = I{a′(a,x)∈B}
∑
x′∈B
pix(x
′, x)
.
III.B Calibration
Some of our model’s parameters are standard and we calibrate them to values typically used in the literature.
A period in the model is a quarter. We set the exponent of labor in the production function to α = 0.64,
the depreciation rate of capital to δ = 0.025, and the level of hours worked when employed to h¯ = 1/3.
We follow Chang and Kim (2007) and set the idiosyncratic labor productivity x shock to follow an AR(1)
process in logs: log(x′) = ρx log(x) + ε′x, where εx ∼ N (0, σx). Using PSID data on wages from 1979 to
1992, they estimate σx = 0.287 and ρx = 0.989. To obtain the transition probability function pix(x
′, x), we
use the Tauchen (1986) method. The borrowing limit is set to a = −2, which is approximately equal to a
wage payment and delivers a reasonable distribution of wealth.
For the remaining parameters, we calibrate two different economies: (1) an economy where taxes are
only lump-sum and are equal across households; (2) an economy with distortionary taxes only. In the
steady state with lump-sum taxes only, the government’s budget constraint reads: T = G, and τ = 0. In
the steady state with distortionary taxes, we use affine capital taxes and non-linear labor income taxes:
τ(wxh, ra) = τL(wxh) + τKra. We set capital taxes to τK = 35%, following Chen, Imrohoroglu, and
Imrohoroglu (2007). For labor taxes, we follow Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) and use a
flexible non-linear tax function as follows: τL(wxh) = 1 − λ(wxh)−γ . As we discuss in Section V.A, γ > 0
implies a tax rate that is increasing in labor income (progressive), while γ = 0 implies an affine labor tax. By
using PSID data on labor income for the years 2001 to 2005, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014)
find a value of γ = 0.15. With IRS data on total income for the year 2000, Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura
(2012) find a value of γ = 0.065. We set γ = 0.1, an intermediate value between these two estimates. The
value of λ is computed so that the government’s budget constraint is met in equilibrium (no public debt).
The implied average labor tax in the economy is equal to 21%, slightly below the 25% US rate (Chen,
Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu, 2007).15 Finally, in each steady state we jointly calibrate β, B and G to
match an interest rate of 1%, a government spending over output ratio of 20%, and an employment rate of
60%, which is the average of the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1964 to 2003. Table 2 summarizes
15This could be explained by our assumption of no public debt in steady state, since the government has no interest
rate payments to finance.
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the parameter values.
Table 3 shows wealth and employment distribution in the model, compared to the PSID data for the total
population over 18 years old in the 1984 survey.16 As often in this class of models, both of our steady-states
underestimate the right tail of the wealth distribution.17 The model with lump-sum taxes also overestimates
the first quintile’s share of wealth, while the model with distortionary taxes roughly matches the left part of
the distribution. For the labor force participation, both steady-states predict a strongly decreasing profile
of participation rates with respect to wealth. This pattern is indeed observed in the data, except for the
first quintile. The model with distortionary taxes again matches the distribution better than the lump-sum
taxes model, as the decreasing profile in participation rate is less pronounced.
In the following two sections, we quantitatively evaluate the model’s response to an unexpected and
temporary increase in government spending. In Section IV we use the model with lump-sum taxes only as
a benchmark to assess the effects of indivisible labor. In Section V, we add a second layer: distortionary
taxes.
IV Lump-Sum Taxes
As a first step, we analyze the case when only lump-sum taxes are used to finance government spending.
The goal is twofold. First, we provide insights on the heterogeneity of household responses in consumption
and hours worked. Second, we assess indivisible labor’s effect in generating a countercylical labor wedge,
and therefore, in solving the puzzle of aggregate private consumption described in Section I.
We analyze the economy’s response to the following shock. At t = −1, the economy is at its steady state
as described in Section III; at t = 0, the government announces that G will increase by 1% at t = 1 and
then gradually come back to its steady-state value.18 The additional government spending is financed by an
equivalent, additional lump-sum tax, which is identical across agents. Thus, lump-sum taxes are used both
at steady state and during the transition. The paths for taxes and spending were unexpected at t = −1, but
perfectly foreseen from then onwards.
16We keep all households where the head of household is 18 or above, and where labor participation is known for
both the head and the spouse, if the head has a spouse. An individual is counted as participating in the labor market
if he has worked or been looking for a job in 1983. Financial wealth includes housing.
17See Cagetti and De Nardi (2008) for more details on wealth concentration in bond economies with heterogeneous
households.
18The increase in taxes may imply an empty feasible set for households close to the borrowing constraint. We allow
agents to build up assets in order to afford the tax increase, using this one period lag in the timing of the shock. The
shock follows an AR(1) process with a persistence of 0.86.
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Table 2: Parameter Calibration
Parameters Lump-Sum SS Distortionary SS
β 0.965 0.987
G 0.243 0.282
B 276 150
τK − 0.35
(γ, λ) − (0.1, 0.79)
α = 0.64 ϕ = 0.40 δ = 0.025 h¯ = 1/3 a = −2
(ρx, σx) = (0.989, 0.287)
Table 3: Wealth and employment distribution in model and data
Quintiles 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Share of Wealth
- Lump Sum Taxes 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.22 0.51
- Distortionary Taxes −0.01 0.04 0.12 0.25 0.61
- Data (PSID) −0.00 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.77
Participation Rate
- Lump Sum Taxes 0.99 0.69 0.51 0.42 0.35
- Distortionary Taxes 0.83 0.63 0.57 0.52 0.45
- Data (PSID) 0.65 0.75 0.69 0.60 0.57
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How heterogeneous are the responses of private consumption and hours worked after the fiscal shock?
To assess this question, we divide households into quintiles by their wealth level a every period: “Quintile
1” refers to the 20%-least wealthy households, while “Quintile 5” refers to the 20%-wealthiest households.
Figure 2 shows the path for G as well as the average consumption and hours responses by quintile every
period. There are significant differences across quintiles. First, the size and the persistence of consumption
responses significantly decrease as agents become wealthier, being almost mute for the highest quintile.
Second, responses in terms of hours worked are also very different across quintiles. In the steady state with
lump-sum taxes, households in the first quintile exhibit an employment participation rate close to one (see
Table 3) and cannot adjust to the spending shock by working more. Consequently, they must adjust by
significantly cutting their consumption. The steady state employment rate of the second and third quintiles
are lower, and these households can react by working more in order to finance the additional tax. Finally,
the highest quintiles mostly use savings to finance the increase in lump sum taxes and only react mildly
in terms of hours worked and consumption. Naturally, the welfare implications of the spending shock will
depend drastically on the household’s wealth.
Figure 3 shows the path for government spending together with responses for aggregate output, consump-
tion, investment, labor, and wages for both our model and for an equivalent model with divisible labor.19
First, in both models, an increase in government spending financed by a lump sum tax generates an increase
in output and hours worked, together with a decrease in consumption. This logic is standard and similar
to the one discussed in Section I.A. Second, while the decrease in consumption is of similar magnitude in
both models, labor and output react by twice as much in our model as they do in the model with divisible
labor. This is indivisible labor’s contribution, since it generates a countercyclical labor wedge. Another way
to read this result is that in the model with divisible labor, an increase in hours of the magnitude observed
in our model would be associated with a much more severe decrease in private consumption. As explained
in I.A, indivisible labor breaks the tight link implied by the household’s intratemporal first-order condition.
Why does a heterogeneous households economy with indivisible labor generate a countercyclical labor
wedge? Typically, after an increase in government spending, hours worked increase and less-productive
households start working more. Because of the endogenous distribution of wealth, less productive households
are also usually less wealthy. Thus, they exhibit a larger marginal propensity to consume out of additional
income. When these relatively poor households start working h¯, they receive a discrete increase in their labor
income because labor is indivisible, and consume a larger fraction of it. Therefore, aggregate consumption
19The model with divisible labor is described in Appendix C. It is calibrated in order to be comparable to the
benchmark model.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response to spending shock per quintile.
decreases less. Chang and Kim (2007) discuss the importance of this channel in a similar economy with
business cycle fluctuations.
We summarize this section with two remarks. First, as we can see in Figure 2, there is a large hetero-
geneity across household’s responses to a government spending shock. Second, with lump-sum taxes, Figure
3 shows that the model predictions for aggregate consumption are very similar to those of a standard real
business cycle model.20 In other words, while responses are remarkably different across heterogeneous house-
holds, they aggregate to a path similar to the one obtained in an economy with a representative household.
In Section V, we will show that this is not the case when the government uses progressive taxes: changes
in progressivity make aggregate responses to spending increases very different to those obtained in a real
business cycle model.
IV.A General Equilibrium Effects
An increase in government spending affects households in two dimensions: taxes and prices. As seen in
Figure 4, after an increase in government spending, wages decrease -0.04% on impact and interest rates
increase +0.2%. We think of this as a price effect of government spending. Arguably, these changes in prices
20For the sake of completeness, Appendix D outlines a real business cycle model with government spending shocks
and Figure 15 plots the impulse response of the model to a 1% increase in government spending.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response to a spending shock, aggregates.
are more harmful for working and indebted households, who now face a higher cost for borrowing and a lower
income from working. At the same time, the additional lump-sum tax is also potentially more harmful for
poor households since it represents a disproportionate fraction of their wealth. Which of these two elements,
prices or taxes, explains the heterogeneity in responses across households? Which is more important in
explaining the large consumption drop of low-wealth quintiles? To obtain a clear answer, we compute the
response to a spending shock in an economy with the interest rate and wages kept at steady-state values:
households still have to pay higher lump-sum taxes, but factor prices are now constant. We think of this as
a partial equilibrium exercise.21
In Figure 5, we compute the consumption equivalent for each quintile after the spending shock - that
is, the percentage of consumption that each agent will be willing to give up in every future period in order
to avoid the increase in government spending. This is done for both economies: the benchmark economy
of Section IV with flexible prices and the fixed prices economy with interest rates and wages kept constant.
Three features are remarkable. First, consumption equivalents are always positive: no agent benefits from the
increase in spending. It is also clear that the welfare loss is larger for poor households, with a consumption
equivalent larger than 1% for the lowest quintile compared to 0.04% for the highest quintile. Second,
consumption equivalents in both economies are virtually identical: the marginal effect of prices on welfare is
21In particular, we impose that labor supply equals labor demand every period, but households’ assets holdings
can be different than firms’ capital demand. Thus, the exercise could be understood as a spending shock in a small
open economy.
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negligible. Third, even if small, the price effect is not homogeneous across agents: the first quintile prefers
the fixed prices economy to the benchmark economy, but the opposite is true for the highest quintile. This
is because households in the latter enjoy higher returns on their savings, while working indebted households
suffer from the decrease in wages and the increase in interest rates.
We also find that, in line with our second remark, the responses at the individual and aggregate levels
are very similar in the benchmark and the fixed prices economy; the general equilibrium effect of government
spending is quantitatively negligible in our model, both at the aggregate level and in generating larger
consumption inequality after a spending shock.22
We conclude that the key determinant of the heterogeneous responses across households is driven by
taxes. In Section V we describe how a more flexible tax policy shapes the effects of a government spending
shock, both at the individual and aggregate levels.
V Progressive Taxes
The results in Section IV suggest that changes in taxes are the key driver of household’s responses after a
shock in government spending. The next step is to analyze the effects of government spending in an economy
22In a similar environment, Li (2013) argues that the price effect of government spending generates significant
inequalities across households. We believe the effect measured in his model is mostly due to lump-sum taxes.
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Figure 5: Consumption equivalents by quintile. Lump-sum taxes exercise: benchmark and fixed-
price economy.
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with a more realistic taxation scheme on income. We do so in this section and find that the response of the
economy to a government spending shock drastically depends on the distribution of taxes across households.
In other words, the progressivity of taxes is key.
We start our experiments from a steady state with distortionary taxes only, as described in Section
III.B. We assume a linear tax on capital income τKra, and a non-linear tax rate on labor income wxh:
τL(wxh) = 1− λ(wxh)−γ . We explain next how this tax function captures different levels of progressivity.
V.A A Non-linear Tax Scheme
We borrow the labor income tax scheme from Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014). The function τ
is indexed by two parameters, γ and λ:
τ(y) = 1− λy−γ
The parameter γ measures the progressivity of the taxation scheme. When γ = 0, the tax function implies
an affine tax: τ(y) = 1 − λ. When γ = 1, the tax function implies complete redistribution: after-tax
income [1− τ(y)] y = λ for any pre-tax income y. A positive (negative) γ describes a progressive (regressive)
taxation scheme. The second parameter, λ, measures the level of the taxation scheme: one can think of 1−λ
as a quantitatively-close measure of the average labor tax.23 Thus, an increase in 1−λ captures an increase
in the level of the taxation scheme (it shifts the entire tax function up), while an increase in γ captures an
increase in progressivity. It turns the entire tax function counter-clockwise. Figure 6 shows how the tax
function changes for different values of γ and λ.
V.B Government Spending with Progressive Taxes
As in the previous section, we assume that at t = 0 the government unexpectedly and temporarily raises
government spending G by 1%.24 Simultaneously, the government announces the taxation scheme that will
be used to finance the increase in expenditures. In particular, the government announces a path for the
labor tax progressivity {γt} that will be implemented jointly with the increase in spending. Capital taxes
are kept at their steady-state value (35%), and the sequence for {λt} adjusts such that the government’s
budget constraint (9) is satisfied every period; we assume no public debt.
We explore the implications of three different taxation schemes: (1) Constant Progressivity: in this
23When γ = 0, 1− λ is exactly the labor tax. In our calibration with γ = 0.1, the average labor tax is 0.211 while
1− λ ≈ 0.204.
24In the previous section, the increase in spending was announced one period ahead. The reason was that, with
lump-sum taxes, many households would face an empty feasible set with an unexpected increase in taxes. This is no
longer the case with progressive taxes, and this lag is not necessary.
19
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Income
Ta
x 
ra
te
 
 
Benchmark
Higher (1−λ)
Higher γ
Figure 6: Non-linear tax as a function of two parameters (λ, γ).
case, γ is kept at its steady state level; (2) Higher Progressivity: γ temporarily increases from 0.1 to 0.11;
(3) Smaller Progressivity: γ temporarily decreases from 0.1 to 0.09. Note that the tax scheme used in
every case is progressive (γ is always positive); only the level of progressivity changes. Also, all experiments
generate the same revenues per period for the government. Finally, households have perfect foresight about
the future paths of spending and taxes in all cases.
The top right panel of Figure 7 shows the path implied for 1 − λ. When γ is constant, the level of
the tax scheme has to increase since the government needs to raise more revenues: the average labor tax
increases. However, when progressivity γ increases, the government can afford a mild decrease in the level
of the taxation scheme since it is taxing higher income at a higher rate. On the contrary, a decrease in γ
requires a large increase in the tax level 1− λ to finance the new spending.
The bottom panel of Figure 7 shows the economy’s responses for output and aggregate consumption in
these three experiments. Our findings are threefold. First, output and consumption multipliers to a spending
shock depend crucially on the taxation scheme used. It is not only the magnitude, but also the sign of the
multipliers that can change. Second, with constant (or smaller) progressivity, the shock in spending results
in a contraction of both output and consumption. The reason is that average tax rates, as measured by
1− λ, must increase to balance the government’s budget constraint, which is contractionary.25 Third, when
25Our experiment with fixed γ is qualitatively similar to the result of Baxter and King (1993): in a standard
real business cycle model with a representative agent, an increase in government spending financed through a larger
income tax is contractionary.
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Figure 7: An increase in government spending financed with same, more and less progressive taxes
on labor income.
government spending is financed with a more progressive taxation scheme, the model can generate a joint
increase in public and private consumption. The key difference is that progressive taxes distribute the tax
burden towards wealthy agents. In turn, wealthy agents partly use their buffer savings to absorb the shock,
thus responding only mildly to the spending shock. Furthermore, with the increase in progressivity, some
less wealthy households actually experience a decrease in taxes. This induces them to consume and work
more, generating an expansion.
It is worth emphasizing that all the taxation schemes described above generate the same amount of
revenues for the government (balanced budget). Different multipliers are obtained as a result of different
levels of progressivity: the key mechanism analyzed here is how the burden of taxes is distributed across
households, not over time. To the best of our knowledge, this intuitive finding is new in the literature.
V.C Solving the Puzzle
As highlighted in the introduction, many models encounter difficulties in generating a joint increase in public
and private consumption. In our model, when an increase in government spending is financed by a more
progressive tax on labor income, the effect on output and consumption is expansionary, making the model
more consistent with the evidence. Table 4 shows the range of output and consumption multipliers found
in previous work together with the one obtained in our model when using more progressive taxes.26 Our
26See Table 1 in section I.
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Table 4: Multipliers
Output Consumption
Data [0.30, 0.90] [0, 0.5]
Model 0.48 0.12
results are in the range of previous empirical studies. We argue next that these multipliers are obtained with
a very small increase in progressivity.
In our experiment, together with the increase in spending, the progressivity parameter γ increases from
0.1 to 0.11. What does this mean in terms of tax rates? Are these big or small changes? Figure 8 plots the
average labor tax for the entire economy, as well as the average one faced by each quintile. The tax scheme
used implies an average labor tax fall from 21.12% to 20.95%, a 0.17% decrease only.27 The distribution of
the labor tax per quintile reflects the increase in progressivity: it drops for the two first quintiles, remains
flat for the third one, and increases for the two highest quintiles. The drop in the first quintile is about 1%
(from 14% to 13.1%) and the increase in the top quintile is 0.5% (from 27.9% to 28.4%). Not surprisingly,
responses across quintiles reflect the heterogeneous change in taxes. As shown in Figure 9, the least-wealthy
quintiles respond to the lower taxes by increasing hours worked and consumption. The wealthiest quintile
decreases labor, but its change in consumption is minor since these households can use buffers of assets to
smooth out the shock. Overall, the economy experiences an expansion.
We conclude this section with two remarks. First, responses at the individual and at the aggregate level
crucially depend on the taxation scheme used by the government, and the heterogeneity across households’
responses does not wash out at the aggregate level. Modeling heterogeneous agents is key: in a model with
a representative household, all experiments would collapse to a unique increase in the labor-tax rate faced
by the representative household. Second, the expansionary effect of government spending occurs because of
the increase in tax progressivity and despite the increase in government spending. The expansion would be
larger if, for the same increase in progressivity, government spending were kept constant. We will show this
explicitly in Section VII.
V.D General Equilibrium Effects
As in Section IV.A, we want to measure the importance of price changes in explaining the economy’s response
to the increase in government spending. As before, we evaluate the model in a partial equilibrium set-up to
27The multiplier on consumption can still be positive with a smaller increase in progressivity, resulting in a drop
on the average labor tax of 0.1% only.
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Figure 8: Average labor tax when progressivity of the taxation scheme on labor income increases.
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Figure 9: Responses of consumption and hours worked per quintile when progressivity of the
taxation scheme on labor income increases.
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Figure 10: Consumption Equivalents per Quintile, General Equilibrium and Fixed Prices
obtain an answer: the path for government spending and progressivity {γt} are as in Section V, but wages
and interest rate are kept constant.28 The main message of section IV.A remains: general equilibrium effects
of government spending are small compared to the effects of changes in taxes.
Figure 10 plots the consumption equivalent for each quintile, both for the benchmark case with flexible
prices and the fixed prices economy. Due to the increase in progressivity, least-wealthy households face lower
taxes and are better-off with the shock (negative consumption equivalent). Analogously, wealthy households
are worse-off (positive consumption equivalent) since they face higher taxes. In addition, poor households
prefer the fixed price economy, while the opposite is true for wealthy households. Because wages decrease
and interest rates increase with the spending shock, the price effect of government spending is more harmful
for indebted working households. In other words, the price effect of government spending tends to increase
inequalities across households. Finally, the difference in welfare between the benchmark and the fixed price
economy is negligible. Thus, the same intuition applies as in the lump-sum case.
28The path for λ required to satisfy the government’s budget constraint will also be different.
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V.E Evidence: the Heterogeneous Effects of Government Spending
When government spending is financed with an increase in the labor tax progressivity, our model has two
main predictions regarding the heterogeneity of household’s responses. First, changes in taxes decrease
consumption inequality at the moment of the shock, as seen in Figure 9. Second, the price effect of government
spending, although small, actually increases welfare inequalities, as seen in Figure 10. We argue next that
these two implications are found in empirical work using micro-data to measure the effects of government
spending on households.
In a recent paper, De Giorgi and Gambetti (2012) use CEX data for the period 1984-2008 to evaluate
the effects of government spending on households with different consumption levels. Using a structural VAR
approach they find that consumption inequality decreases after an increase in government spending. This is
in line with our model predictions. Also recently, Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) find the opposite result, with
low-income households facing a (small) decrease in consumption after an increase in government spending.
As they argue their estimation strategy underestimates the wealth effect of government spending, that is,
the effect from changes in taxes.29 We interpret this as capturing mainly the price effect of government
spending. As explained in Section V.D, this price effect induces a small increase in consumption inequality,
in line with Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) findings.
VI Evidence: a Narrative Approach
Section V shows that it is possible to deliver a joint increase in public and private consumption, only if
the government uses more progressive taxes to finance the increase in spending. Thus, the key implication of
our model is that multipliers crucially depend on the progressivity of the tax scheme used: positive (negative)
output and consumption multipliers are obtained when government spending shocks are financed with more
(less) progressive taxes. In this section, we provide empirical evidence that supports our model predictions.
We use TAXSIM data from 1960-2006 to construct an estimate of the progressivity parameter γ for the
United States.30 The upper panel of Figure 11 plots the time series obtained for γ, showing that there have
been large changes in the progressivity of the tax system in the United States over the past 50 years, with
an increase during the sixties and a sharp decline during the eighties. The lower panel of Figure 11 plots
defense spending during the same time period. The vertical dashed lines are the Ramey-Shapiro events: the
first one is on 1965:1 and corresponds to the Vietnam War; the second one is the Carter-Reagan military
29See page 3 of their paper.
30Appendix E contains the details on how γ was estimated
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Figure 11: Taxes progressivity and defense spending. US 1960-2006.
built-up starting on 1980:1; and the last one is on 2001:4 relating to increase in defense spending after
9/11 (Bush built-up). The remarkable feature is that the US experienced a significant - and different -
change in progressivity after each one of the Ramey-Shapiro events. During the Vietnam War, progressivity
increased, while during the Carter-Reagan military build-up, progressivity decreased. After the Bush build-
up, progressivity slightly decreased as well. To the extent that these changes in progressivity were foreseen
at the moment of the Ramey-Shapiro event, we can exploit these differences in our estimation strategy
to test the main model predictions. In particular, in light of our results in Section V, we expect to find
positive multipliers for the Vietnam War, negative multipliers for the Carter-Reagan built-up, and negative
but smaller multipliers for the Bush build-up.
We estimate a VAR including a different dummy variable for each one of the Ramey-Shapiro events
following Perotti (2007). In particular, we estimate the following system:
Xt = A0 +A1t+A(L)Xt−1 +
3∑
i=1
Bi(L)Di,t + t (10)
where Di,t, i = 1, 2, 3 is the dummy variable for each of the three Ramey-Shapiro events. The vector
Xt = [Gt, Yt, Ct] includes defense spending, GDP and private consumption of non-durables and services, all
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Figure 12: Impulse responses after the three Ramey-Shapiro events, 64% confidence intervals.
of them in real per capita units and in logs. We use quarterly data from 1959-2006, the matrix A(L) includes
four lags and Bi(L) includes six lags. We also include a constant A0 and a linear trend A1t. Note that, by
having a different matrix of coefficients Bi(L) for each dummy, we allow for different responses of Xt to an
innovation in each Ramey-Shapiro event.
Figure 12 plots defense spending, output and consumption responses to each one of the dummy variables
in (10). The Vietnam War resulted in an expansion of output and consumption, while the opposite happened
after the Carter-Reagan military build-up. Finally, multipliers after the Bush build-up are close to zero.
Thus, government spending shocks appear expansionary only in periods of increasing progressivity. This is
consistent with our main prediction.
VII Transfers
As discussed earlier, private consumption in our model increases after a government spending shock
because of the rise in progressivity, but despite the increase in public consumption. In other words, the
expansion in private consumption would be larger if, given the same change in progressivity, there were
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no increase in government spending. Indeed, if public consumption is kept constant, then revenues levied
through taxes are also constant. Thus, when progressivity temporarily increases, the level of the labor
tax function, 1 − λ, can decrease more, resulting in a larger boom in output and consumption. Figure 13
shows the economy’s response to an increase in progressivity γ as in Section V.B, but with no increase in
government spending.31 Output and consumption increase by 0.22% and 0.14% respectively, versus around
0.1% and 0.05% in Section V.B. In other words, a temporary shock in progressivity is a powerful tool in
generating expansions.
Similarly, a government that temporarily increases tax revenues through an increase in progressivity,
and transfers these additional resources in a lump-sum fashion to the least-wealthy households (rather than
spending it as public consumption), would also be more successful in achieving a boom in consumption.
As recently emphasized by Oh and Reis (2012), these type of transfers across households accounts for a
significant fraction of government spending. Figure 14 describes the economy’s response to the same increase
in progressivity γ, where the additional resources levied through taxes are given back lump-sum to the 10%
lowest-wealth households at the moment of the shock. Private consumption increases by more than 0.2%,
versus 0.05% in Section V.B. Consequently, a one-time redistribution of wealth can also have large effects
on aggregate consumption.
The exercises in this section suggest that changes in progressivity could be an interesting tool in analyzing
different public finance topics such as debt payments, deficit sustainability and welfare. A formal analysis
of this is a priority for future work.
VIII Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to assess the effects of government spending in an economy with heterogeneous
households. We develop a model where agents are heterogeneous in wealth and productivity. We also
impose indivisible labor choice. Our findings are sharp: (1) There is a large heterogeneity in the effects
that government purchases have on households. (2) What shapes this heterogeneity is the taxation scheme.
In particular, the distribution of the tax burden across households is key to understand heterogeneity: we
focused on revenue-neutral taxation schemes, that distribute taxes across households, not over time. At the
aggregate level as well, multipliers depend crucially on the distribution of the taxation scheme. We find that
when government expenditures are financed with a more progressive taxation scheme, multipliers on output
31One may think of this experiment as measuring the effects of transfers: for a revenue-neutral budget, the govern-
ment redistributes wealth from the wealthier to the least-wealthy households through rise and reductions of taxes.
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Figure 13: More progressive taxes, constant government spending
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Figure 14: More progressive taxes, lump-sum transfers
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and consumption can be positive, solving the puzzle stated in Section I. Finally, we find empirical support
for our predictions: US output and consumption multipliers have been positive only in periods of increasing
progressivity.
The crucial result in our paper is that small dynamics in the progressivity of taxes have large effects on
aggregate variables. We believe that this can be very useful in addressing several questions. We leave this
for future research.
New York University
30
Appendix
A Algorithm for Steady State Equilibrium
In this section we describe the algorithm used to compute the steady state given a set of parameters. This
accounts for computing policies and an implied measure that satisfy our equilibrium definition. Also, recall that our
calibration strategy is such that we target an equilibrium interest rate of 1%. We describe the algorithm for the
economy with lump-sum taxes in four steps.
1. We first choose a grid of asset holdings a and idiosyncratic productivities x. For the asset grid we used
Na = 2842 points between [−2, 340] with more points for low values of a. For the productivities we used a grid with
Nx = 27 points and constructed the nodes using Tauchen (1986) method.
2. Given a set of parameters, we solved for the value functions V E , V N and V at each grid point of the individual
state. Note in particular that, given that we are targeting r = 0.01, the first order condition of the firm results in an
implied wage rate w because of constant returns to scale. At this point we also obtain the policies functions a′(a, x),
c(a, x) and h(a, x). This was done in the following steps:
(a) Make an initial guess of the value function V0(ai, xj) ∀i = 1, . . . , Na and ∀j = 1, . . . , Nx
(b) Update the value functions by evaluating them at the grid points
V E1 (ai, xj) = max
a′∈{a1,...,aNa}
log (wh¯x+ (1 + r)a− a′ − T )−B h¯1+1/γ1 + 1/γ + β
Nx∑
j′=1
pix(xj′ , xj)V0(a
′, xj′)

V N1 (ai, xj) = max
a′∈{a1,...,aNa}
log ((1 + r)a− a′ − T )+ β
Nx∑
j′=1
pix(xj′ , xj)V0(a
′, xj′)

where pix(x
′, x) is the Markov process for the idiosyncratic shock. Next update
V1(ai, xj) = max{V E1 (ai, xj), V N1 (ai, xj)}
(c) If V0 and V1 are close enough, we found a solution. Otherwise, use V0 = V1 and go to step (b)
3. Given the obtained policy functions in last step, we compute the measure µ(a, x) as follows:
(a) Guess an initial measure µ0(ai, xj) ∀i = 1, . . . , Na and ∀j = 1, . . . , Nx
(b) For every a ∈ {a1, . . . , aNa} and x ∈ {x1, . . . , xNx} compute
µ1(a, x) =
Na∑
i=1
Nx∑
j=1
I{a = a′(ai, xj)}µ0(a,i , xi)pix(x, xj)
(c) If µ1 and µ0 are close enough, we found the time invariant measure. Otherwise, use µ0 = µ1 and go to step (b)
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4. With the measure just obtained, compute aggregate capital K =
∑
a,x a
′(a, x)µ(a, x) and labor supply
L =
∑
a,x h(a, x)µ(a, x). Then, form the firm’s first order condition, compute r = −δ + α(K/L)1−α. If r is close to
our target, we solved the model. Otherwise, update β and go back to step 2.
The equilibrium with progressive taxes requires an additional inner loop, where for a given capital tax, τk, and
for a given level of the progressivity of the labor tax γL, a guess for λL is used to compute policies. Then, one has to
check that the revenues actually levied by the government, given the policy functions and stationary measure, have
to be equal to the level of government spending.
B Algorithm for the Transition
In this Section, we describe the algorithm used to compute the impulse responses to a shock in government
spending. When government expenditures are financed with lump-sum taxes, the algorithm can be described in four
steps.
1. Fix T arbitrarily large. Choose {Gt}Tt=0 exogenously. The transition for lump-sum taxes {Tt}Tt=0 is implied
by the path for government spending.
2. Guess a sequence of interest rates {rt}∞t=0. Assuming that, in T , the economy is back to steady-state, and
given the sequence for prices, compute policy functions backwards. Notice that at T we already know the value
function of the household.
3. Using the steady-state measure in t = 0 and the policy functions computed in step 2, compute the measure
along the path.
4. Using the measure and policy functions, compute aggregate variables along the path, and compute the implied
path for the interest rate {r?t }Tt=0. If the implied path is close enough to the initial path, stop. Otherwise, update
the guess for interest rates {rt}∞t=0 and go back to step 2.
Computing the transition with progressive taxes requires an additional inner loop, where a guess for a sequence
{λL,t}Tt=0 is made to compute policy functions in step 2, and has to be such that the revenues levied by the government
are equal to the path for government spending.
C Divisible Labor Model
In this section we briefly describe the model with divisible labor used for comparison in Section IV as well as the
calibration strategy.
The economy is populated by a representative household, a representative firm and a government. The firm and
the government are identical to the ones in the model of the paper, so we omit their description. Household problem
is as follows:
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V (a, x) = max
c,h,a′
{
log(c)−B h
1+1/ϕ
1 + 1/ϕ
+ βEx′
[
V (a′, x′)|x]} (11)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ wxh+ (1 + r)a− T − τ(wxh, ra)
a′ ≥ a
Thus, households have the same utility as in the benchmark model, but they face a divisible labor decision.
The calibration strategy is the same as in the main model. We pick G = 0.2525. We choose the discount factor
β and the labor disutility parameter B to obtain a interest rate r = 0.01, and a ratio G/Y = 0.2. We obtained
{β,B} = {0.976, 240}.
D Real Business Cycle Model
In this section we briefly describe a real business cycle model with government expenditure.
The model equilibrium allocations are the result of the following program
U = max
{Ct,Lt,Kt+1}t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
logCt −B L
1+1/ϕ
t
1 + 1/ϕ
]
subject to
Gt + Ct + It ≤ Yt
Yt = K
1−α
t L
α
t
logGt = (1− ρG) logGss + ρG log(G)t−1 + εt
The calibration strategy is the same as in the main model. The only parameters that obtain different values
are the discount factor β and the labor disutility parameter B. We choose Gss = 0.2525 to have the same amount
of government spending as in Section IV. The value for B is set so that the government spending to output ratio
is 20% on average. Similarly, the value of β is chosen so that the average interest rate, measured as the marginal
productivity of capital, is 1%. We obtained {β,B} = {0.99, 60}.
Figure 15 shows the model response to a 1% increase in government spending.
E Measure of Progressivity
To construct our measure of progressivity, we estimate our tax function using TAXSIM data. We explaine the
details below.
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Figure 15: Real Business Cycle Model - Government Spending Shock.
On the TAXSIM website, the average tax rate and the average marginal tax rate faced by US tax payers for
every year between 1960 and 2011 can be found. Using our tax function τ(y) = 1−λy−γ , the average tax rate τ¯ and
the average marginal tax rate ¯ are respectively given by
τ¯ =
∫
τ(y)dµ(y) = 1− λ
∫
y−γdµ(y) (12)
¯ =
∫
∂τ(y)y
∂y
dµ(y) = 1− (1− γ)λ
∫
y−γdµ(y) (13)
where µ(y) is the distribution over income y, which we normalize to
∫
dµ(y) = 1. Then, for every year we obtain γ as
γ =
¯− τ¯
1− τ¯ (14)
The data can be found at this link: http://users.nber.org/ taxsim/allyup/ally.html.
A deeper analysis of tax progressivity and its evolution in the United States can be found in Feenberg, Ferriere,
and Navarro (2014).
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